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Abstract—Modern web sites commonly interact with third-
party domains to integrate advertisements and generate revenue
from them. To improve the relevance of advertisements, online
advertisers track user activities online with third-party cookies.
However, excessive online tracking might cause unreasonable
access to users’ browsing information. Users are thus in need of a
simple way to control the sharing of their browsing information
with advertisers in order to protect their privacy. We survey
current techniques to conceal browsing information from third
parties (e.g., block third-party cookies) and propose a novel
approach that enables advertisements to have discrimination
capabilities without allowing for excessive tracking of users.
Our solution uses a collection of third-party cookies to restrict
the tracking on a per web site basis. We present various
implementations of our proposal and provide a proof of concept
code to demonstrate its feasibility.
I. INTRODUCTION
Online advertising is at the center of the Internet econ-
omy [31]. It is a large and successful business because: (i)
It offers immediate publishing of advertisements not limited
by geography or time, and (ii) it can be personalized by
tracking users spatially over different web sites and over
time. The tracking is done by exploiting client-side browser
state (e.g., third-party cookies). It permits advertisers to relate
advertisements to users’ interest [33] and to users’ online
behavior [12], [20], [24]. Many advertisers are thus attracted
to this new advertising distribution channel.
Web sites also benefit from hosting online advertisements
as it generates revenue. In the recent years, a novel business
model based on online advertising created new opportunities
online for bloggers, newspapers, and web applications. Users
also benefit from online advertising because it sponsors the
free access to valuable content and services [33]. For example,
newspapers offer articles online for free and generate revenue
from the accompanying advertisements. Similarly, Google
provides a competitive email service for free, and embeds
advertisements with emails to sponsor its service. Finally,
users also appreciate online advertising as it can provide
insightful links, especially if it is well targeted [21].
However, the proliferation of online advertisements raises
privacy concerns. By tracking users on the Internet, advertisers
can expose their personal activities and obtain information
such as consulted web pages and social network connections.
For example, third-party cookies (i.e., cookies used with a
third-party server of the visited web site) enable advertisers
to track users across web sites affiliated with them. Hence,
excessive online tracking might allow for the identification of
users online [28], [29], [30].
As a consequence, several applications have emerged to
limit the privacy footprint of users online by automatically
blocking cookies [1], [6], [7].1 However, blocking all first-
party cookies (i.e., cookies of the visited web site) has adverse
effects on surfing the web and might affect the usability of
web pages. To solve the privacy/usability trade-off of first-
party cookies, Shankar and Karlof [34] propose to improve
the management of first-party cookies by letting users decide
which cookies to block/accept based on a visual comparison
of web pages with and without first-party cookies.
Similarly, blocking all third-party cookies presents a signif-
icant problem for the online advertising industry. All visits
to an advertiser are still recorded, but a person who has
deleted his third-party cookies is not recognized as the same
returning visitor. Consequently, blocking third-party cookies
makes advertising less relevant as it will be based only on the
current page browsed by the user (i.e., context) and not on
what the user might have done in the past (i.e., behavior). The
current management of third-party cookies does not permit for
the tuning of behavioral tracking done by advertisers: It allows
advertisers to track users either across all web sites or none.
This paper proposes a novel solution to solve the pri-
vacy/traceability trade-off of third-party cookies (Fig. 1). It
manages all cookies used with third-parties in a privacy-
friendly manner. Our solution enables advertising to have dif-
ferentiation capabilities without allowing for excessive track-
ing of users online. To do so, we assume that: (i) Advertisers
want users to click on advertisements, and need to track users
to improve online advertising relevance; (ii) users are willing
to share some information with advertisers in order to get
relevant advertisements, free content and free services.
We give users a fine-grained control of the dissemination
of their information to advertisers on a per web site basis. To
do so, our solution maintains a collection of alternative third-
party cookies with each online advertiser. Third-party cookies
are sent to the advertiser depending on the consulted web site.
The same third-party cookie can be sent to an advertiser for
different web sites if it improves the advertisements relevance
without allowing for excessive tracking. The decision to share
a third-party cookie across different web sites depends on the
visited web site and user privacy preferences. Users can set
their preferences either manually or automatically by relying
on online communities [23]. We test the feasibility of our
solution by implementing a Firefox extension and show that
1Note that instead of blocking cookies, users can also directly opt out from
advertising on advertisers’ web sites [2].
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Fig. 1. Privacy/traceability trade-off. At (1, 0), the default third-party cookies
management allows for the complete tracking of users online. At (0, 1),
blocking all third-party cookies impedes online tracking by third parties. Our
solution allows to trade-off privacy and traceability by limiting spatial and
temporal traceability of users online.
users’ traceability can be controlled without requiring any
changes from advertisers. This paper is part of the recent
trend of providing tools to help individuals reduce their privacy
footprint online [13], [14], [15], [16], [34].
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. HTTP Cookies
HTTP Cookies2 are data items stored in the user browser,
which are assigned to users by web servers. On subsequent
visits, browsers send back the cookies to web servers, along
with HTTP requests. Cookies that are sent to the server
hosting the visited web page are called first-party cookies (FP-
cookies). FP-cookies are used by web servers to keep the state
of the connection, e.g., to differentiate users. As web pages
might contain references to components needed to render the
page (e.g., images or advertisements), web browsers issue
additional HTTP requests for these elements. If the elements
are stored on servers in other domains, cookies that are sent
during the retrieval of these components are called third-party
cookies (TP-cookies). TP-cookies allow third-party servers to
track users across websites. In practice, a cookie can be used
as first-party cookie or third-party cookie (e.g., a website can
operate both in first-party and third-party mode). Hence, in
this paper, we consider the privacy-friendly management of
all cookies sent to third-parties.
Cookies are usually set with the Set-Cookie HTTP header
and sent with the Cookie HTTP header. The Set-Cookie header
is sent by the server in response to an HTTP request from a
user to create a cookie in the user’s browser. Cookies come in
two flavors: Session cookies have no expiration date and expire
after the Internet session ends, whereas persistent cookies are
long-lived. For each HTTP message sent to a server, if there
is a cookie in the browser that matches the server, the cookie
is included by the browser in the HTTP Cookie header.
2From here on, referred to as cookies.
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Fig. 2. Tripartite graph G. Visible servers are associated if they share a
connection with a hidden server. Visible servers are connected to a hidden
server if they host advertisements from the hidden server. With our solution,
user u can use multiple TP-cookies to appear as two different users u and u′
to the hidden server d2.
B. System Model
In compliance with [29], we denote web servers accessed
by users to download first-party components as visible servers
and servers accessed to download third-party components as
hidden servers. A visible server is connected to a hidden server
when the access to the visible server causes the access to the
hidden server.
We model the relation between users, visible servers and
hidden servers with a tripartite graph G = (U∪S∪D,E1∪E2)
where U is the set of users, S is the set of visible servers and
D is the set of hidden servers (Fig. 2). A user u ∈ U can
connect to a visible server si ∈ S (a visible server is equivalent
to a web domain). The web domain can host several web sites
b` ∈ Bi, where Bi is the set of web sites in the web domain si.
A web site is uniquely identified with a URL. A visible server
is connected to a hidden server dj ∈ D if it hosts content from
dj . In other words, an edge (u, si) ∈ E1 ⊆ U × S exists if a
user in U visits a visible server in S. An edge (si, dj) ∈ E2 ⊆
S × D exists if a web server redirects its users to a hidden
server in D. We assume that the web browser of a user u
keeps the history of accessed web sites Hu(B), where B =⋃
si∈S Bi and the history of accessed hidden servers, Hu(D).
Web browsers also store cookies ck ∈ K, whereK is the set of
all cookies in the system and remember the server that caused
their assignment. For example, in Tab. I, the TP-cookie ID =
agbfd12 is related to doubleclick.net. We denote Hu(K) the
set of all the cookies stored in the browser of a user u. Without
loss of generality, we focus on a single user in our analysis.
Consequently, we omit the index u.
C. Online Advertising
Online advertisers track users online to improve the effi-
ciency of online advertising:
• Contextual tracking allows for the real time targeting of
advertisements to the content of a page (e.g., Gmail).
• Behaviorial tracking allows for the use of information
about previously and currently browsed web pages.
A popular technique to track users online makes use of
persistent TP-cookies. Online advertisers set an identifying
TP-cookie in the browser, which will be sent back each time
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Visible Server Hidden Server Third-party Cookie
www.orkut.com doubleclick.net ID=agbfd12advertising.com ID=19576981
www.myspace.com doubleclick.net ID=agbfd12
www.sourceforge.net doubleclick.net ID=agbfd12quantserve.com user=97v124ag3
www.mininova.org quantserve.com user=97v124ag3
TABLE I
EXAMPLE OF THIRD-PARTY COOKIES OF USER u. DOUBLECLICK.NET CAN
TRACK USER u ACROSS THREE DIFFERENT WEB SITES.
the browser sends a request to the advertiser together with
an IP address, a URL, and a referrer. The referrer identifies,
from the point of view of an Internet resource, the URL of the
resource which links to it. Online advertisers can thus track
users temporally: Multiple visits of the same user on the same
web site can be identified by online advertisers. They also
track users spatially: Users are tracked across different web
sites connected to the same advertiser.
Consider the example in Tab. I: When user u browses
orkut.com, which hosts advertisements from doubleclick.net,
u is assigned a TP-cookie from doubleclick.net during
their first communication. Then, if u browses another web
site also hosting advertisements from doubleclick.net (e.g.,
myspace.com), u’s browser will use the previously assigned
TP-cookie with the HTTP packets sent to doubleclick.net.
Therefore, doubleclick.net learns that u has visited both
orkut.com and myspace.com by checking the referrer and
can track u spatially over the two visible servers.
As in [29], we say that visible servers are associated when
they are connected to one or more common hidden servers. In
Fig. 2, visible servers s1 and s2 are associated as they share
the hidden server d1. In order to keep track of associations
between visible servers, we say that the TP-cookie ck is
linked to (si, dj) if si is the visible server that caused the
communication with the third party dj . We also denote with
υ(si, dj , ck) the number of visits of a user to a hidden server
dj with the TP-cookie ck, caused by the visible server si.
There are other techniques to track users online. HTTP
redirections for example can also be used to track users with
first-party cookies. However, this technique is not as popular
as tracking based on TP-cookies as shown in Section IV. In
addition, Doppelganger browser extension [34] thwarts such
tracking. Other tracking techniques are discussed in Section V.
D. Threat Model
As cookies are used to identify subsequent visits of users,
they increasingly reveal more information about users’ brows-
ing habits (Tab. I). The traceability of users based on TP-
cookies was characterized in [28], [29], [30] showing that
a majority of web servers are associated with at least one
other visible server. The HTTP referrer also reveals sensitive
information as it identifies the visited visible server. For
example in Tab. I, the referrer of user u accessing the hidden
server doubleclick.net from orkut.com will contain the full
Visible Server Hidden Server Third-party Cookie
www.orkut.com doubleclick.net ID1=agbfd12advertising.com ID=19576981
www.myspace.com doubleclick.net ID1=agbfd12
www.sourceforge.net doubleclick.net ID2=2pokn92quantserve.com user1=97v124ag3
www.mininova.org quantserve.com user2=012nfnaw2
TABLE II
EXAMPLE OF THIRD-PARTY COOKIES OF USER u. TP-COOKIES ARE
MODIFIED TO LIMIT THE PROFILING ACROSS WEB SITES.
URL of the web page browsed on the visible server, thus
revealing to the advertiser the social graph of user u.
Advertisers can thus learn a significant amount of informa-
tion about users’ activities online. The threat is exacerbated if
the collected data permits to infer users’ real identities. Users’
privacy with respect to online advertisers is thus protected if
the users have the ability to prevent third parties from tracking
their activities online. Note that we do not assume cooperative
tracking [25], i.e., web sites do not cooperate with online
advertisers to track users.
III. PRIVACY-FRIENDLY COOKIE MANAGEMENT
In order to control the information shared with advertisers,
we propose to regulate the use of TP-cookies on a per web
site basis depending on the visited web site (Tab. II) and on
user privacy preferences. The solution is automated and allows
users to control the privacy/traceabity trade-off. The decision
to use a TP-cookie across different web sites connected to a
same advertiser depends on the trade-off between the benefit
caused by the TP-cookie and its associated privacy cost (or
amount of privacy loss).
The benefit of including TP-cookies is measured by the
improved relevance of the served advertisements. The privacy
cost depends on the amount of information shared with ad-
vertisers. We categorize the cost in two groups, namely the
spatial and temporal traceability. In this section, we propose
three approaches for the privacy-friendly management of TP-
cookies that differ in the achieved trade-off.
A. No Spatial Tracking across Domains and Limited Temporal
Tracking
A simple approach to limit the privacy cost consists in
completely preventing spatial tracking across domains and
only allowing for limited temporal tracking: TP-cookies can
be used for a certain period of time LT or for at most LV
visits to the same web domain. The TP-cookie management
policies are:
• Spatial tracking policy: For each new web domain si,
connected to a known hidden server dj ∈ H(D), existing
TP-cookies (if any) are not sent and instead a new TP-
cookie is assigned by the third-party dj .
• Temporal tracking policy: For a known web domain si,
the same TP-cookie ck ∈ H(K) is used with requests to
the third-party server dj for the time period LT or for at
most LV visits, υ(si, dj , ck) < LV .
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This approach allows users to minimize the privacy cost:
No spatial tracking is allowed except within a web domain for
a limited time period. However, it also reduces the potential
benefits of online advertisements because no information is
shared with third parties across domains. In summary, this
approach limits spatial tracking to LS web sites, where LS is
the maximum number of web sites hosted by a web domain,
and temporal tracking to LV or LT .
B. Limited Spatial and Temporal Tracking
To improve the relevance of advertisements, in the second
approach, users share information with a limited number of
associated web sites. To keep the privacy cost acceptable
for users, the spatial tracking is limited to at most LS web
sites per category C. Categories determine the type of web
sites (e.g. business, news), hence limiting the tracking of
online advertisers to specific topics. We rely on the existing
categorizations of web sites based on URLs [3], [9], [12]. We
assume that there is a fixed number of categories NC and that
each web site belongs to a single category. The TP-cookie
management policies are refined such that, for each category,
a TP-cookie can be sent for at most LS web sites:
• Spatial tracking policy: Each new web site b` /∈ H(B),
connected to a known hidden server dj ∈ H(D), is
automatically classified into one of the NC categories.
If b` belongs to category C and if there is a TP-cookie ck
assigned by dj to web sites in the category C, we verify
before using ck that:∑
bm∈H(B)∩C
β(bm, dj , ck) < LS (1)
where bm ∈ sm and
β(bm, dj , ck) =
{
1 if ck is linked to (sm, dj)
0 otherwise.
In other words, if the number of times the cookie ck was
used with the third-party dj in the category C is under the
limit LS , then the TP-cookie ck can be associated with
requests to the pair (sm, dj). Otherwise, ck is not sent
and a new TP-cookie is assigned by the third-party dj .
• Temporal tracking policy: An existing TP-cookie ck ∈
H(K) can be used with a known web site b` ∈ H(B) in
category C connected to the third-party server dj ∈ H(D)
for the time period LT or for at most LV visits, i.e.:∑
bm∈H(B)∩C
υ(bm, dj , ck) < LV (2)
Consider the example in Tab. II with LS = 5. The third-
party doubleclick.net can track user u on orkut.com and
myspace.com because the same TP-cookie ID = agbfd12
is sent for both web sites. In this case, the TP-cookie was
shared because both web sites belong to the same category
(social networks) and the threshold is LS > 2. However, the
TP-cookie was not shared with sourceforge.net (different
category). Hence, user u appears as a different user u′ to the
advertiser (Fig.2).
With these policies, third-parties can profile users on a
limited number of associated web sites of the same category
and only during a limited time period. Hence, they can
target advertisements to specific categories and improve the
relevance of advertising for those. This approach has two
drawbacks: (i) The number of web sites over which users can
be tracked in each category is fixed, and (ii) all web sites are
treated equally, as if they revealed the same information to
third parties.
C. Weighted Spatial and Temporal Tracking
In this approach, we attribute weights to web sites based
on two criteria: First, certain web site categories induce a
higher privacy cost on users, whereas others bring more value
to advertisers [8]. Second, URLs leak information depending
on their content and their length. Hence, we propose to weigh
web sites based on their category and the specificities of their
URLs.
Web site categories: Individual users perceive differently
the value of their browsing information and the potential
privacy costs. Hence, the decision to reveal interest in certain
web site categories should be based on user privacy prefer-
ences. We model users’ preferences by assigning a weight
ω1(b`) ∈ [1, NC ] to each web site depending on its category.
The granularity of users’ preferences depends on the number
of categories NC . If a category is assigned a high weight, it
means that it contains sensitive information that should not
be shared with third parties. For example, social networks
category can be assigned a higher weight than shopping web
sites.
URL specificities: URLs that contain information
specifically identifying user activities are more valuable
to advertisers than generic URLs. For example,
www.google.ch/search?hl=en&q=computers reveals the
user’s interest in computers, his preferred language (English)
and his probable location (Switzerland); thus it is more
valuable than www.google.com. The privacy cost of a URL
can be computed with regular expressions by comparing
strings in the URL with predefined n-grams3 (e.g., q=,
hl=) [11]. Each URL is thus evaluated on-the-fly and
assigned a weight ω2(b`) ∈ (0, 1]. If the weight of a URL
is high, then it means that it contains potentially sensitive
information.
The total privacy cost γ(b`, dj , ck) of visiting a new web
site b` /∈ H(B) with a TP-cookie ck associated with dj is a
weighted product of privacy costs based on the two criteria:
γ(b`, dj , ck) =
{
ω1(b`)·ω2(b`)
NC
if ck is linked to dj
0 otherwise.
where the number of categories NC normalizes the cost
w1(b`). Weighing web sites enables users to dynamically
adjust the number of web sites over which they can be spatially
and/or temporally tracked depending on the cumulative privacy
3n-grams are consecutive character sequences of length n.
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cost. In addition, advertisers can spatially track users across
different categories.
The TP-cookie management policies specify that a TP-
cookie may be used with a number of associated web sites
as long as its privacy cost is limited:
• Spatial tracking policy: For each new web site b` /∈
H(B) associated with a known hidden server dj ∈
H(D), the weights ω1(b`) and ω2(b`) are automatically
determined. An existing TP-cookie ck ∈ H(K) assigned
by dj can be associated with a request to the new web
site b` if the following condition holds:∑
bm∈H(B)
γ(bm, dj , ck) < LS (3)
where LS is the maximum privacy cost allowed for a
cookie. Otherwise, ck is not sent and a new TP-cookie
will be assigned by the third-party dj .
• Temporal tracking policy: For a known web site b` ∈
H(B) connected to a third-party server dj ∈ H(D), the
same TP-cookie ck ∈ H(K), can be used for the time
period LT or for at most LV visits:∑
bm∈H(B)
υ(bm, dj , ck) · ω2(bm) < LV (4)
The time period during which a user can be profiled now
depends on the weight of the web site.
Consider the following example. User u visits
four web sites sequentially: b1: www.google.com, b2:
www.google.ch/search?q=computers, b3: www.facebook.com,
and b4:www.facebook.com/search?q=nevena. We assume that
all web sites are connected to the same third-party dj , that
there are no TP-cookies in the browser initially, and that
NC = 10, LS = 0.5, and LV = 5.
The weights (ω1(b`), ω2(b`)) are automatically computed:
(3, 0.1), (3, 0.9), (10, 0.1), (10, 1) for b1 to b4 respectively. The
weights ω1(b`) depend on user preferences. In this example,
we observe that user u is unwilling to reveal information
about his social networks and assigns a high weight to
facebook.com. The weights ω2(b`) are computed based on
the URLs. For generic URLs (b1 and b3), the weights are low,
whereas for specific URLs (b2 and b4), the weights are high
because they contain keywords that reflect the user’s interests.
The policy for spatial tracking allows the same TP-cookie to
be sent for the three web sites b1, b2 and b3 as their cumulative
privacy cost is below the threshold:
∑3
m=1 γ(bm, dj , ck) =
(0.1 · 3 + 0.9 · 3 + 0.1 · 10)/10 = 0.4 < 0.5. However, the
fourth web site b4 requires a separate TP-cookie for this URL
as its privacy cost is too high: γ(b4, dj , ck) = 1. Note that the
spatial policy allows a TP-cookie to be shared across 16 web
sites of the same category and same URL weight as b1.
In addition to the spatial policy, the temporal policy must be
verified before sharing a TP-cookie across web sites b1 and b2.
We compute:
∑2
m=1 υ(bm, dj , ck) · ω2(bm) = 1·0.1+1·0.9 =
1 < 5. As it is lower than LV , the same TP-cookie can be
used for b1 and b2. Note that the same TP-cookie can be used
50 times with web sites of the same category and same URL
weight as b1, whereas it can be used only 5 times for web
sites of the same category and same URL weight as b2.
Users have a fine-grained control over the dissemination of
their personal information and can decide when, where and for
how long they will be tracked. Yet, advertisers can track users
across categories depending on users’ privacy preferences and
serve relevant advertisements.
D. Discussion
The third approach is superior to other approaches as it al-
lows for a finer-grained control of the information shared with
third parties. To set their preferences on the allowed amount
of tracking (LS , LT , and LV ), and on web site categories,
users have two possibilities: (i) Users can manually set their
preferences for each parameter and each category [12], or
(ii) users can automatically define their preferences supported
by online social communities. In particular, users can reuse
profiles of preferences created by other users. Recently, there
have been several efforts to support the privacy management
via community expertise [1], [5], [23]. For example, Ad Block
Plus [1] (an advertisements blocking extension) is based on a
subscription service: Users of the extension can automatically
download lists of URLs to block from other users.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
In order to test our approach, we implemented an extension
of the Firefox web browser called PrivaCookie as a proof of
concept.4 In this section, we first explain the main challenges
of the implementation, describe our study, and provide results.
A. Cookie Management
The extension first detects cookies sent to third-parties and
then applies the privacy-friendly cookie management proposed
in the previous section.
1) Third-Party Cookies Detection: Our extension detects
cookies sent to third-parties by comparing the URL of the cur-
rent HTTP connection with the URL of the server that caused
the connection. To do this, Firefox provides objects and inter-
faces, namely nsIChannel and nsICookiePermission. Starting
with Firefox 3, the browser remembers with the function getO-
riginatingURI of nsICookiePermission the originating server
of each connection (i.e., the server that caused the connection).
Hence, TP-cookies are detected by analyzing every outgoing
connection to a server (nsIChannel) and determining whether
the destination corresponds to the originating server or to a
third-party server. In other words, by simply comparing the
URL of the current connection with the originating URL, we
determine whether the connection is directed toward a third-
party server, and implicitly determine whether cookies sent
over this connection are TP-cookies. This method is used
by Firefox to properly detect TP-cookies. With this method,
cookies sent to a first-party server in the past, and then sent
to third-party servers are also detected. In our extension, all
detected TP-cookies are stored in a local table. Note that, in
the current implementation, we do not parse packets to find
4The code is available at http://icapeople.epfl.ch/freudiger .
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Fig. 3. Number of hidden servers for each of the top 20 web domains.
TP-cookies set in Javascript. TP-cookies set in Javascript are
thus simply blocked. However, as shown in the results, TP-
cookies set in Javascript represent a minority of TP-cookies.
2) Cookie Management Strategy: The extension imple-
ments the no spatial tracking across domains and limited
temporal tracking policy. It first intercepts all TP-cookies
exiting/entering the system as explained above. If a TP-
cookie ck ∈ H(K) should not be sent, then the cookie
is removed from the exiting HTTP request. The reply from
the web server will then contain a new TP-cookie that the
extension stores in its local table. Unlike Firefox, the local
table remembers for each TP-cookie the corresponding pair
of associated web domain and third party (si, dj) (Tab. II).
The implementation of the second and third approach will
require fetching alternative TP-cookies from the collection of
TP-cookies stored in the local table and including them in the
exiting HTTP request.
B. Study
In order to gather realistic data about page downloads and
obtain a reproducible Internet browsing experience, we use the
Firefox browser augmented with the Pagestats [18] extension.
The extension allows the browser to run in batch mode where
a list of sites is specified. We choose 10 pages from each of
the top 20 domains across all categories from Alexa’s global
top sites [3]. A total of 200 web pages was retrieved from a
single location in February 2009.5
C. Results
First, we investigate the use of TP-cookies online and the
amount of tracking by third parties. Then, we evaluate the
proposed extension. All the results were gathered with the
developed extension.
5The data set can also be found at: http://icapeople.epfl.ch/freudiger/.
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Fig. 4. Number of visible servers for each hidden server. The dashed
line represents the limitation of the number of associations imposed by the
extension.
1) Statistics: According to official specifications [10], the
maximum supported size of cookies is 4KB. Hence, cookies
can potentially carry a significant amount of information about
the state of HTTP connections. However, we observe that the
size of TP-cookies is ∼ 300B on average. In other words,
TP-cookies are mostly used as identifiers and do not carry
much information. This allows for the real time manipulation
of TP-cookies and does not require extra resources.
Fig. 3 shows the relation between visible servers corre-
sponding to the top 20 domains and hidden servers. We
observe that visible servers are connected to a large number of
hidden servers: Roughly half of the web domains are affiliated
with at least 4 hidden servers. In particular, AOL.com is
connected to a total of 16 hidden servers. Out of the 70
hidden servers, we identified a majority of online advertisers
(72%). Among the 20 visited web domains, 16 embedded
advertisements. Hence, considering the small sample of web
sites, the tracking done by third parties is significant.
In Fig. 4, we show the number of connections between vis-
ible and hidden servers (and thus the number of associations).
By browsing on 200 web pages among the top 20 domains,
we contacted 70 different third-party servers. The most popular
third-party server is doubleclick.net which is associated with
10 visible servers. Hence, one online advertiser was able to
track users on 10 out of the 20 visited domains. Note that
25 hidden servers are at least associated with 2 web domains.
Tab. III shows the associations between visible and hidden
servers for the most popular domains and advertisers.
We also observed in our study that only 2 out of 20 web
domains used redirections to track users online, whereas 16
out of 20 used third-party cookies. Most redirections were
actually used to enable users to post content on aggregators
(e.g., digg.com) or to embed third-party content on web pages
(e.g., youtube videos). This confirms that tracking based on
TP-cookies is the primary concern for the privacy of users
with respect to online advertisers.
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Hidden Server Visible Server
Yahoo Ebay AOL IMDB Orkut Msn Myspace HI5 Blogspot Rapidshare
doubleclick.net c1|c1,1 c1|c1,2 c1|c1,3 c1|c1,4 c1|c1,5 c1|c1,6 c1|c1,7 c1|c1,8
quantaserve.net c2|c2,1 c2|c2,2 c2|c2,3 c2|c2,4
atmdt.com c3|c3,1 c3|c3,2 c3|c3,3 c3|c3,4 c3|c3,5
advertising.com c4|c4,1 c4|c4,2
yieldmanager.com c5|c5,1 c5|c5,2 c5|c5,3 c5|c5,4 c5|c5,5 c5|c5,6
TABLE III
TOP 10 ASSOCIATED VISIBLE SERVERS CONNECTED WITH THE MOST POPULAR ADVERTISERS. c1|c1,i REFERS TO THE TP-COOKIES ASSIGNED
WITHOUT|WITH THE EXTENSION FOR EACH VISIBLE SERVER i.
Finally, we evaluate the number of TP-cookies set in
Javascript by comparing the local table of TP-cookies of the
extension with the table of cookies of Firefox. We obtain that
only 4% of the TP-cookies are set in Javascript, thus indicating
that our current approach captures the majority of TP-cookies.
2) Success of the Extension: The extension generates and
maintains a collection of TP-cookies for each third-party
server based on the pair (si, dj). The current implementation
does not allow for spatial tracking and thus the size of
associations is limited to 1 (dashed line in Fig. 4). In other
words, each TP-cookie can be used with only one pair (si, dj).
For example in Tab. III, the TP-cookie c1 of doubleclick.net
is replaced with a new TP-cookie c1,i for each associated
visible server i. Hence, the size of the collection of TP-
cookies depends on the number of associations. In this study,
the extension caused 81 additional TP-cookies assignments.
Compared with the “block all” solution, our extension in its
current form allows for tracking by a single advertiser on a
single domain over a limited period of time. The extension
works as expected and demonstrates the feasibility of our
approach.
V. ONLINE ADVERTISERS COUNTERMEASURES
Online advertisers might consider other tracking techniques
to circumvent the privacy-friendly cookie management pro-
posed in this paper.
Online advertisers can track users by their IP address. How-
ever, there are various drawbacks with this tracking technique.
First, web servers must remember the IP address of each
connection, i.e., the state of their connection, in contradiction
with the current design of the Internet [10]. Second, an IP
address may not only identify a single computer, but could
also refer to a computer network using Network Address
Translation (NAT).6 Third, because there are not enough IP
addresses to cover the number of users, many ISPs have
resorted to the use of dynamic IP addresses. This means that
users could be assigned a different IP address every time
they access the Internet. Finally, IP traffic can be anonymized
using either Tor [19] or an anonymizer [4]. In other words, IP
addresses may be unreliable to track users online.
The cache of the web browser also permits to track users
online. Juels et al. [27] propose to use the cache to store
6NAT enables multiple hosts on a private network to access the Internet
using a single IP address.
persistent, server-accessible data object called cache-cookies.
Jackson et al. [25] show that because the access to cached
elements is not restricted, a web server can verify the presence
in the cache of an object from another web site and thus track
users across different web sites. To prevent cache tracking,
Jackson suggests to regulate the access to the cache by
implementing the same-origin principle for cache cookies:
Only the server that puts a file in a browser cache can access
it later. However, this does not avoid tracking by third parties.
The browser history can also be used to track users by
exploiting visited URLs stored in the browser [35]. Jackson
et al. [25] show that the access to the browser history can
be regulated by the same-origin policy. Jakobsson et al. [26]
makes use of the browser history property as a feature for
privacy-friendly tracking. Web servers aggregate information
from users’ history in a privacy-friendly manner. However,
users must trust that web servers will not abuse the system.
Plugins (particularly Flash) are another obstacle to online
privacy because their own policies may be more permissive
than those of web browsers. For example, plugins make use
of their own cookies not managed by web browsers. Hence,
general policies of browsers do not apply.
The privacy-friendly TP-cookie management proposed in
this paper can be applied to solve these problems, thus letting
users control the amount of shared information with third-
parties.
VI. RELATED WORK
The use of cookies is regulated in Europe [22] and the
USA [17]. These regulations define strict rules on the col-
lection, setting and use of cookies. For example, storing
cookies in a user’s computer is allowed only if: (i) The user
is provided information about how this data is used; and
(ii) the user is given the possibility of denying this storing
operation. However, these regulations are insufficient to protect
the privacy of users online as they mostly focus on clarifying
the use of cookies.
Shankar and Karlof [34] propose Doppelganger, a Firefox
extension to manage cookies. Users only have to make a
small number of high-level decisions to manage their cookies.
The value of a cookie is determined visually by comparing
a web page with and without the FP-cookie. TP-cookies are,
however, systematically blocked.
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Krishnamurthy and Malandrino [28] propose to filter the
data exiting web browsers. They suggest a binary management
of the information: Block or allow. They investigate the trade-
off between web pages usability and privacy and show that
blocking third-party cookies reduces tracking online without
affecting the usability of web pages. Hence, disabling third-
party cookies is a good solution for the privacy of users.
However, it entirely impedes behavioral advertising, making
advertisements less relevant to the user interest [32]. Hence,
we consider an approach that studies the trade-off between
advertising customization and privacy.
The same-origin principle is another spatially restrictive
policy used by other extensions [25]. However, it is too
permissive to prevent third-party tracking. It allows a TP-
cookie to be sent to a third-party for an unlimited number
of associated web sites. Our solution complements the same-
origin principle by limiting the re-use of TP-cookies.
The support of privacy management by a social community
is suggested by Goecks and Mynatt [23]. The authors develop
a tool called Acumen that users can consult to improve their
privacy decisions. We rely on similar mechanisms for the
definition of user preferences.
Recently, online advertisers developed tools that lets users
choose interest categories to improve the relevance of adver-
tising [12]. With this approach, besides observing browsing
activities, online advertisers also get additional personal in-
formation. Instead, with our solution, users can still choose
interest categories to obtain relevant advertisements, while
sharing less information with advertisers.
VII. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORK
We have considered the trade-off between advertising cus-
tomization and online tracking of users. We have proposed
a novel approach to handle TP-cookies that enables users to
control the amount of information shared with advertisers. To
do so, our solution maintains a collection of TP-cookies for
each advertiser. The decision to use a given TP-cookie is based
on a cost-benefit analysis that depends on the visited web
site and the value of the TP-cookie. To valuate TP-cookies,
we considered three approaches that take into account user
privacy preferences and differ in the achieved trade-offs. We
have evaluated the feasibility of our solution by implementing
a Firefox extension. Our solution empowers users to manage
TP-cookies in a privacy-friendly manner. Hence, together with
Doppelganger, our extension provides a complete privacy-
friendly management of cookies.
We plan to implement the advanced cookie management
approaches and improve the handling of TP-cookies set in
Javascript. We also intend to consider other criteria, such as
users’ level of trust in different advertisers.
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